



How do we solve the problem of bovine tuberculosis? For over a hundred years 
this has proved a contentious and intractable question. The complexities that have 
surrounded the transmission of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) and attempts to protect 
consumers and eradicate the disease in cattle not only reveal conflicting 
constructions of risk and expertise, but also highlight how the boundaries between 
animals and humans, and between different animals, can be disrupted. Whereas in 
her opening comments Angela Cassidy sensitively identifies the broad historical 
shifts that structured controversy between the late-1960s and the mid-1990s, in this 
introduction, I outline the history of responses to bTB from the 1890s to c.2000 to 
place the volume in context, and highlight some of the historical parallels between 
contemporary and earlier debates.  
For Victorian health officials and governments bTB was essentially a public 
health problem tackled through inspection to protect consumers from ingesting 
meat and milk from tuberculous livestock. While local public health and veterinary 
controls remained problematic, by the 1911 the findings of three royal 
commissions had reinforced pre-existing assumptions about the dangers of bTB to 
consumers and the importance of cattle-to-human and cattle-to-cattle 
transmission. As attention shifted after 1900 from diseased meat to infected milk, 
European models of eradication attracted interest as concern about bTB drew on 
anxieties about food safety, child health, national efficiency, and farming. For the 
public health lobby, the eradication of btB offered a means to reduce an important 
childhood disease, while for farmers and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
(MAF) there were important economic considerations. In the 1920s, efforts were 
made to increase resistance among cattle through breeding and improved stable 
hygiene, and research was conducted into developing a cattle vaccine. With the 
science and value of pasteurization initially contested, measures to promote 
disease-free herds and support for eradication schemes grained ground in the 
1920s and 1930s with the 1937 Agriculture Act establishing the rudiments of a 
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national system of testing in cattle with veterinarians at the centre. However, the 
voluntary nature and economics of eradication and a shift from arable to livestock 
and dairy farming, combined with farmers’ apparent unwillingness to stamp out 
bTB, ensured that levels of the disease in the national herd remained high until the 
1950s.1 
Progress in eradicating bTB was therefore slow: it was not until 1964 that it 
became government policy to detect and contain the disease in cattle through 
routine testing, slaughter, compensation, and movement controls. By 1971, 
complete eradication had not been achieved but the incidence of reactors in 
individual herds had fallen dramatically. It was in this context that the discovery in 
1971 of bTB in a dead badger at a farm in Gloucester following an atypical 
outbreak of bTB provoked immediate concern. While as the contributors to this 
volume reveal, the reasons for rising levels of bTB in the UK after 1971 remain 
open to speculation, veterinarians and farmers highlighted a ‘reservoir’ of infection 
in wild badger populations and in 1975 a programme of badger culling was started. 
Despite the absence of research demonstrating a concrete link, MAF became 
embroiled in a campaign to stop badger-transmitted TB in cattle. Badger-borne TB 
became an intractable problem and culling a deeply contentious issue. As attention 
focused on badgers, the role of cattle movements, other animals, or testing in the 
spread of the disease attracted little attention despite questions having been asked 
about these vectors since the 1890s. Only by the mid-2000s did work confirm 
much earlier assumptions that cattle-to-cattle transmission was an important factor, 
while studies came to show that culling and perturbation increased incidences of 
TB in badgers, issues explored by the contributors as they unravel competing 
opinions and uncertainties about rising levels of bTB in the UK. 
Whereas before the 1960s appeals for the eradication of bTB were made in 
the name of public health, child health and national efficiency, or to support the 
growing dairy industry, the post-1965 history of bTB as a public scientific and 
                                                          
1 Phillips J. and French M. (1999) State regulation and the hazards of milk, 1900-
1939. Social History of Medicine 12: 371-88. 
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policy controversy has been a complex one of competing interpretations, interests 
groups, and emotions. As MAF commented in 1986, since the 1970s, badger 
controls have been influenced by ‘practical and political expediency, field 
experience, research, public relations considerations, the perplexities and 
imponderable nature of TB badger/cattle relationships and much discussion 
among interested parities’.2 They have equally been shaped by a particular 
perception of the badger as a problem, and by appeals based on different 
constructions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ badgers.3 
As emotively charged images of badgers and culling were presented in the 
media and by campaigners against culling, policymakers increasingly sought to 
involve a wider range of interest groups. For some the involvement of 
conservation and animal welfare groups resulted in a paralysis of policy, but 
responses to bTB need to be seen in the context of the uncertainties surrounding 
transmission. With evidence of the role of badgers in the resurgence of bTB 
remaining circumstantial, proving that badgers were responsible for outbreaks was 
problematic. In an effort to resolve uncertainties, successive governments turned 
to expert advisory committees as they attempted to navigate the emotive and 
politicized issues surrounding culling. If the Badger Panel established in 1976 to 
provide a forum for advice from experts and leading organizations explained 
government policies and sought agreement from interest groups, further reports 
were commissioned to provide an elusive evidence-base for policy. Whereas the 
1980 Zuckerman report reinforced the need for culling and supported a clean ring 
strategy, the 1986 Dunnet report tried to reconcile competing interests and 
recommended a scaling down of culling, an approach that remained in place for 
ten years as BSE came to dominate anxieties about animal health and food safety. 
In 1996, the Badger Panel ceased to meet following the creation of an independent 
                                                          
2 Cited in Grant W. (2009) Intractable policy failure: The case of bovine TB and 
badgers. British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11: 561. 
3 Cassidy A. (2012) Vermin, victims and disease: UK framings of badgers in and 
beyond the bovine TB controversy. Sociologia Ruralis 52: 192–204. 
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review to investigate whether badgers were responsible for the spread of bTB in 
cattle and whether culling strategies worked. Two years later, the Independent 
Scientific Group on Cattle TB was set up to conduct the Randomized Badger 
Culling Trial to once again address uncertainties and establish the effects of badger 
culling on incidences of bTB in herds. Its findings were contradictory. In response 
the then Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs secretary, Hilary 
Benn, decided that a renewed cull would be too risky in the face of uncertainty and 
public opposition. It is against this policy background, uncertainties surrounding 
transmission, and the emotions generated by culling, that contributions to this 
Witness Seminar need to be understood as they fill a vital gap in historical studies 
by addressing policy responses to bTB after 1960. 
While badger culling introduced a hitherto unknown emotional dimension 
to debates about bTB and involved the public and NGOs in animal health policies 
in new ways, the pre- and post-1965 history of bTB suggests interesting recurrent 
themes around bTB and animal diseases. Responses to bTB not only reveal 
important issues about the role of scientific knowledge in policy and the 
boundaries of expertise in responses to epizootic and zoonotic diseases, but also 
their limits in the face questions about risk and the complexities of how bTB is 
transmitted to humans or between animals. Whether framed as a public health, 
laboratory, veterinary or farming problem, since the 1890s uncertainty and the 
pursuit of evidence to support policy has been central to responses to bTB. 
Questions about diagnosis, testing, and vaccination important in contemporary 
debates equally troubled meat inspectors, veterinarians, laboratory scientists, and 
farmers from the 1900s to the 1940s. Likewise, since the 1890s, rather than science 
setting the agenda, uncertainties surrounding bTB have repeatedly been met 
through government investigations and state-sponsored studies into the nature of 
transmission and testing in an attempt to find answers. Tensions between different 
models of expertise and shifting expert groups have continually resurfaced in 
responses to bTB. For example, from the 1870s to the 1930s conflict between 
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public health officials and veterinarians over who was best qualified to protect the 
public and identify tuberculous cattle was an important feature of debate. Further 
issues have regularly re-appeared around bTB. Here we might think of repeated 
debates about the impact of bTB on farming and the cost of eradication or the 
obstacles to testing, which were just as important in the 1920s and 1930s as they 
are to contemporary policymakers. Thinking about this longer history of bTB not 
only allows us to place this volume in context, but also helps identify recurrent 
concerns that are important to understanding the post-1965 history of responses to 
bTB, eradication, and the problems of policymaking in the face of epizootic and 
zoonotic diseases. 
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